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ow do we know that other people are conscious?
This “problem of other minds” has traditionally
been answered by citing others‟ behavior, for the
power of the intentional stance to predict and
explain human behavior is unrivaled by any other system of
explanation. I will argue, however, that the traditional solution
succeeds only insofar as consciousness is conceived in terms of
functional relations. If consciousness is conceived in terms of
intrinsic, ineffable, indescribable qualitative states, the problem
of other minds is unsolvable. Not only does the behavior of
others fail to prove that they have qualia, it provides no evidence
whatsoever for that contention, and neither does any other
argument. Consequently, I will argue, we ought to conceive of
consciousness in purely functional terms.
I will begin by stating some assumptions. First, I will
assume that we are able to describe, predict, and explain, a great
deal of others‟ (and our own) behavior in terms of mentalistic
categories: beliefs, desires, feelings, and so on. That is, Dennett‟s
assertion that taking the “intentional stance” yields predictive
and explanatory power not available by any other known
method (Dennett 1987) is correct.1 Furthermore, I will assume
that the categories of the intentional stance are good enough that
a future theory of psychology will not abolish folk psychology,
contrary to Paul Churchland‟s thesis (Churchland 1981). (If it
didn‟t, „how do we know that other people are conscious?‟
would be an empty question. One can only know things that are
true.)
The first characteristic of the mental that I would like to
consider is our ability to use the intentional stance. Now, if the
intentional stance works in the deep way I am supposing it does,
then we can treat folk psychology as a largely true (but
incomplete) theory of the behavior of people.2 The theory of folk
psychology, unfortunately, does not provide us with
exceptionless universal laws: at best we get rough-and-ready
generalizations, but such lack of rigor is hardly a deathblow to
the theory. Insofar as it is such a theory, it can be treated as a set
of relations between observables (behaviors, etc.) and mental
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states, so that being in a certain mental state provides
dispositions to certain actions and to other mental states. In other
words, mental categories are useful for prediction and
explanation because we can treat them as functional categories.
OBJECTION: Why should we believe that mental categories are
functional categories?
REPLY: Suppose we could not treat mental categories as
functional categories. Then mental states would not provide
dispositions to behaviors, or they would not provide dispositions
to have other mental states. If this assertion were true, we would
be unable to use them to predict others‟ behavior and mental
states, which we are obviously able to do. Conversely, suppose
that in addition to treating mental categories as functional
categories, we need to consider some of their other properties in
order to predict and explain the behavior of others using the
intentional stance. But (by hypothesis) the functional
characterization of mental states contains all the information how
they cause dispositions to behavior, so no other quality of the
state can be necessary in order to predict behavior. What of
explanation? A characteristic of mental states that was useful for
the explanation of observable phenomena, but that did not
(ceteris paribus) explain that those phenomena were more likely
than other phenomena would be no explanation at all! I
conclude, therefore, that insofar as mental states are relevant to
the prediction of observable phenomena such as behavior, they
are relevant in virtue of their functional properties.
OBJECTION: Yes, the mental concepts of folk psychology do
provide dispositions to behavior and other mental states, but
why should we believe that they do this in a way that can be
described as functionalist?
REPLY: Once we have established that the mental states of folk
psychology provide dispositions to behave in certain ways and
to have other mental states, we have established that folk
psychology can be described functionally. The functional states
of the theory are mental states, the outputs are behaviors, and the
inputs are environmental stimuli.
Nonetheless, we cannot at present describe folk
psychology as a functional theory. That is, we know how to
apply folk psychological concepts, but not how to explain their
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use (at least not very well). The development of such a
description would require a substantial joint research program in
linguistics and psychology. We would need research in order to
determine the conditions under which people are willing to
apply various mental predicates to other people, and further
research to describe the sorts of predictive and explanatory
inferences that people make on the basis of those applications.
By hypothesis, we are able to use the theory of folk
psychology to predict and explain the behavior of others, but we
cannot make the same inferences by using any other method.
Consequently, we can safely conclude that other people are
functionally equivalent to beings with mental properties.
Unfortunately, this line of reasoning alone will not get us to the
conclusion we want: namely, that other people have mental
properties, since, in general, functional equivalence is not
sufficient for equality. We need to introduce some other
principle.
We get the cleanest argument by accepting the
functionalist hypothesis. If being functionally equivalent to a
conscious entity is being a conscious entity, then the remainder
of our proof comprises one line: People are functionally
equivalent to beings with minds; ergo, they have minds. Thus
the problem of other minds is solved.
OBJECTION: What is „functionally equivalent‟?
REPLY: I will distinguish between two definitions of functional
equivalence. The first definition of equivalence defines two
systems as functionally equivalent iff both can be adequately
described using a functional description where the same causal
relations hold between the functional states and the inputs and
outputs of the system and the description of both systems make
reference to the same set of inputs and outputs. I will term
systems that are equivalent in this sense „I/O-equivalent.‟
Unfortunately, this definition of equivalence, when plugged into
the functionalist thesis I give above, is apt to make functionalism
parochial by denying mental states to entities that certainly have
them.3 Consequently, I am led to accept another notion of
equivalence in my definition. Two systems will be called Aequivalent iff both can be adequately described using a
functional description and the description of both systems where
the same causal relations hold between the functional states and
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the inputs and outputs of the system, but the inputs and outputs
need not be the same for both systems. Thus A-equivalency is
necessary, but not sufficient, for I/O-equivalency. The same
terms can be applied to functional states using analogous
definitions. The functionalist thesis I am pushing, then, is that to
be conscious is to be A-equivalent (or nearly A-equivalent) to a
system that is well-described using folk psychology.
OBJECTION: If we can define having conscious states as being a
certain type of functional system, then we will be able to find a
functional characterization for every sufficiently complex system
(the Atlantic Ocean, say) according to which it is conscious. And
the fact of the matter is that the Atlantic Ocean is not conscious,
no matter what functional characterization of its causal relations
we attribute to it. Surely countenancing mental-state attributions
of this kind is a reductio ad absurdum of functionalism!
REPLY: Those who make this objection are right to point out
that, on the face of it, attributing mental states to a system such
as the Atlantic Ocean seems bizarre. In fact, virtually every
speaker of English (with the exception of a handful of animists,
philosophers, and cognitive scientists) would agree the claim is
definitely false. In the face of such overwhelming agreement
(and given my complete inability to produce any arguments in
favor of the alternative position), I will concede the point that,
given the way words like „conscious‟ are used in modern
English, the claim I have been advancing is not true.4
Nonetheless, I maintain, it is still the best solution to the problem
of other minds.
What an absurdity, to attempt to solve a philosophical
problem by embracing an abjectly false claim! Nonetheless, I will
argue, the problem we face here is not a problem with
functionalism, but with our customary way of speaking.
Accepting liberalism would require a substantial alteration in the
way we speak about mental properties (as it would attribute
such properties to a vast number of entities to which we do not
now attribute them), but, I will argue, there are good reasons to
accept such a change in our customary manner of speaking, and
no such reasons (aside from inertia) to preserve it.
So what are the advantages of redefining mental
predicates in purely functional terms? Taking the intentional
stance allows us to obtain a substantial amount of predictive and
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explanatory power that is not (presently) available to us by any
other means. The redefinition I am proposing would not remove
any of this power from the intentional stance, and if embracing it
leads to the sort of research program I outlined earlier, it might
well expand it. Treating beliefs, goals, desires, and so on as
purely functional states would not prohibit us from using the
intentional stance to predict and explain the actions of others just
as we always have, even to the point of enabling us to
understand (as best we can) others‟ comments about the taste of
buttered toast.
Furthermore, as Dennett is wont to point out, the
predictive power of the intentional stance is a matter of objective
fact. It follows that if the hypothesis (that the functionalist thesis
I am pushing leads to massive liberalism) is true, then at least
some properties of many systems can be described using the
intentional stance. In the case of most systems, this fact is
probably a mere curiosity – if there are patterns in the Atlantic
Ocean that can be described using the intentional stance, they are
probably of no real interest to us – but it is possible that we will
one day discover systems that can be described in a useful way
using categories with functional properties very similar to those
of the intentional stance, so that a wide variety of their input/
output relations can be usefully described using the intentional
stance. Such a possibility may sound fantastical, but the universe
contains a great many complex systems. So a liberal ascription of
conscious mental states may allow us to gain understanding, and
we will lose no predictive or explanatory power that we already
possess by adopting such a change of language.
OBJECTION: Consider the famous „Absent Qualia Argument,‟
which has myriad variations, all of which essentially run like
this:
1) The functionalist hypothesis is that having mental states
merely requires a certain sort of functional state.
2) For any functional state, we can imagine a zombie that is in
that functional state, but has no conscious, first-person,
qualitative experience (i.e. has no qualia).
3) Having qualia is intrinsic to at least some mental states.
4) Therefore, a system need not be conscious merely in virtue of
having certain functional states.
REPLY: The argument made by many (e.g. Dennett 1991) who
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wish to deny (4) involves denying both (2) and (3) by denying
that qualia exist. Such arguments tend to depend on examples
designed to spur intuitions, and I will shamelessly admit that I
find most of the literature on this subject confused. I will
therefore ignore this particular counter-counterargument in
favor of a more roundabout approach.
Consider that the question we are (ultimately) attempting
to answer is „how do we know that other people are conscious?‟
We have already shown that the functional portion of the folk
psychological theory of mind is the only portion of the theory of
mind that does any work in predicting or explaining any
observable phenomenon. If qualia are important to our story
about the mind, then, the problem of other minds reduces to the
question, „how do we know that other people really have qualia,
rather than being unconscious zombies who fool us by virtue of
being I/O-equivalent to conscious beings?‟
And so we run into the problem: there is no way to
distinguish between zombies and entities with qualia! There is
not a shred of evidence (or any other kind) that I can point to to
support the contention that George Bush has qualia, or to
support the contention that he is a zombie. Consequently, if we
demand that our notion of a mental state include having qualia,
we are lead to the unfortunate conclusion that we do not know
that other people are conscious!
OBJECTION: In effect, what you are saying is that the problem
of other minds would be solved if we meant something else by
„minds‟, as your proposed recharacterization of consciousness
removes the essential element – qualia! Two plus two would
equal seven if we meant something different by „two,‟ too, but
you can‟t prove „2 + 2 = 7‟ by redefining „2‟!”
REPLY: A functionalist redefinition of „consciousness‟ will not be
sufficient to solve the problem of other minds for those for whom
the possession of consciousness requires ineffable, indescribable
qualia. Since there is no way to demonstrate (or even provide
evidence for) the proposition that other people have such qualia,
it follows that the redefinition I am now proposing will not
suffice as such a demonstration.
None of this need mean that talk of qualia (as
distinguished from talk of „qualia‟) need vanish. Under my
proposed program of redefinition, we can continue to talk about

FUNCTIONALISM, QUALIA, AND OTHER MINDS
immediate sensory impressions, feelings, and every other state
that is supposed to be a qualia. The difference is that in a liberal
theory, we will make such ascriptions to any system for which it
is functionally appropriate. If we make a robot that simulates a
human being, and it eats buttered toast, we need have no qualms
talking about how the toast tastes to the robot, just as we have no
qualms about discussing how toast tastes to other people.
OBJECTION: You have shown that qualia are not necessary for
any sort of scientific or everyday prediction or explanation, but
there is more to life than prediction and explanation. That agents
really have qualitative experience is important to many moral,
aesthetic, and other types of value systems. Perhaps we can
accept a language from which the idea of really having qualia
has been expunged for the purpose of science, but it cannot be
eliminated from value theory.
REPLY: I have already demonstrated that, using the conception
of qualia employed by people who make these sorts of
objections, there are no grounds for believing that other people
are real experiencers with real qualitative states, rather than
being mere zombies. Consequently, a value system that bases its
evaluations on the possession of qualia makes it impossible to
determine whose experiences are actually deserving of
consideration and whose are not. Such a system cannot be used
in making evaluations, and I see no reason to keep our old habits
of speech simply because they allow us to preserve the illusion
that certain unemployable systems of valuation are employable.
Those to whom these sorts of considerations are compelling may,
if they wish, continue to demand that having qualia be a
necessary condition for consciousness in their idiolects, as long
as they admit that their ascriptions of qualia to others rests on a
leap of faith.
OBJECTION: John Searle offers an argument that suggests that
other people do have qualitative mental states. I fear doing
injustice to his argument by summarizing it, so I will simply
quote him:
If you think for a moment about how we know
that dogs and cats are conscious, and that
computers and cars are not conscious . . . you will
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see that the basis of our certainty is not
“behavior,” but rather a certain causal conception
of how the world works. One can see that dogs
and cats are in certain important respects
relevantly similar to us. Those are eyes, this is
skin, these are ears, etc. . . . behavior by itself is of
no interest to us; it is rather the combination of
behavior with the knowledge of the causal
underpinnings of the behavior that form the basis of
our knowledge. (Searle 1992 p.22)
So the thesis that other people are conscious is perhaps not
proven, but its prior probability is much higher than that of the
thesis that other people are zombies. I can reason from my own
knowledge of my own qualia (we will suppose for a moment
that I have such knowledge), and my picture of the world as
consisting of particles in fields of force that my qualia are caused
by the particular particles and fields of force in my brain. Thus, I
can reason that other entities with similar brains have similar
qualitative experiences.
REPLY: The problem with Searle‟s argument is that it rests on a
seemingly dubious intuition about the sorts of brains that would
produce qualitative mental states. As Dennett comments,
“Perhaps left-handers [sic] brains, for instance, only mimic the
control powers of brains that produce genuine Intentionality!”5
(Dennett 1987 p. 334) Undoubtedly Searle would find Dennett‟s
supposition preposterous, but I doubt he could succeed in giving
any reasons why it was preposterous without begging the
question. He could not begin an empirical investigation to show
that both right and left-handers have the brain characteristics
that produce genuine qualitative experiences: in order to make
such a determination, he would need some independent test to
distinguish zombies from real conscious beings. Since no such
test exists, Searle is flat out of luck.
OBJECTION: Your counter to Searle‟s response is just a crude
form of anti-inductivist skepticism. We do not have any evidence
that physical systems act as if there are electrons because
electrons really exist, as opposed to the theory that physical
systems act as they do because they are functionally equivalent
to systems with electrons, but electrons are not real, but this does
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not stop us from inferring (correctly) that electrons exist. Why
hold qualia to a higher standard?
REPLY: In physics the properties of electrons are limited to the
properties that functionally connect them to other elements of
the theory of physics. A demonstration that a physical system is
(perfectly) I/O-equivalent to a system with electrons is a
demonstration that the system has properties with all the
characteristics we ascribe to electrons. Qualia, by contrast, are
supposed to have characteristics above and beyond their
functional relations, and there can be no evidence that entities
with all the properties of qualia (e.g. “ineffability”), rather than
just their functional properties, exist.
OBJECTION: Block points out that there are many mentalistic
categories whose conditions of application cannot be purely
functional, because they require a certain type of relationship
with the world. (Block 1978) For example, knowledge of some
proposition p requires that p be true, and perception of some
entity E requires that there actually be some E (if there is not,
then the “perception” is a hallucination or mistake of some
form). In general, propositional attitudes cannot be defined
purely by A-equivalence, because having a propositional attitude
requires some causal connection to the content expressed in the
proposition. For example, in Hilary Putnam‟s Twin Earth
example (Putnam 1973), the states of the Earthling who believes
water is wet and the Twin Earthling who believes XYZ is wet are
A-equivalent (or almost A-equivalent), but they are not both the
belief that water is wet. One is causally connected to water; the
other is causally connected to XYZ.
REPLY: Insofar as the application of mental predicates requires
that some proposition not about the person be true, I am inclined
to grant the objection, but it is no serious blow to the theory I am
proposing to grant that some mental states are contingent on the
facts of the world. We can always separate out the functionally
relevant characteristics of the mental state (e.g. the belief that
water is wet, as opposed to knowledge that water is wet) in order
to predict and explain behavior, so there is no real problem.
The objection dealing with the connection of
propositional attitudes to the propositions the attitudes are about
is more significant. One way around the problem would be to
accept that both the Earthling and the Twin Earthling do believe
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the same thing, but that would be perverse at best: one of the
reasons I gave for accepting this recharacterization of our
intentional vocabulary was that it would allow us to continue
using folk psychology as it applies to ordinary people without
any alteration. The correct response, I believe, is to deny that
functional states that are (almost) A-equivalent are necessarily
the same mental state. So the beliefs of the Earthling and the
Twin Earthling are A-equivalent, but they are not the same
belief.
This point suggests that we need some sort of
characterization of what the identity criteria for mental states are,
since A-equivalence is insufficient. My proposal would be that
the development/discovery of such criteria would be part of the
job of the research program I outlined earlier. Finding criteria
that both conformed to our intuitions about mental states (at
least when applied to the case of other people) and were useful
for science would be an important goal of such a program.
Luckily, our ability to apply the intentional stance need
not wait for such a program to achieve success. We can describe
the behavior of other people in intentional terms without it.
Furthermore, we have a test for determining that entities we find
in the world are conscious: if their behavior is well described in a
wide variety of situations using folk psychology, then they are
conscious. Since other people pass the test, they are conscious,
and the problem of other minds is solved.
I have proposed a redefinition of the language we use to
describe mental life. This language would redefine our mental
terms so that the functional relations between them were
preserved, but would concede that these terms can be applied to
any system in which the same functional relations hold. All the
predictive and explanatory power of the intentional language we
use now would be preserved, although many important
questions would be left to future researchers. The problem of
other minds would be solved (since we know that other peoples‟
behavior is well-described using the categories of folk
psychology) at the “price” of conceding that at least some things
which most speakers of modern English would not call conscious
are conscious. The notion of „qualia‟ as “ineffable” or
“indescribable” would vanish from the theory of mind, not
because qualia have been shown not to exist, but simply because
such talk lacks any predictive or explanatory value. Some
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philosophers will complain that theories generated using this
language will fail to explain why people have conscious
experiences, and, given their notion of „conscious experiences,‟
they will be correct. But an inability to explain a „fact‟ that we
can‟t evidence and don‟t need to predict or explain anything is of
little concern to me.
Notes
Undoubtedly many philosophers will think this assertion is far too weak and
would prefer that I make some stronger claim. But I think very few (except
perhaps the Churchlands) will be inclined to doubt it.
2 I am not introducing the supposition that folk psychology is only a theory of
the behavior of other people, but merely asserting that it is at least such a
theory.
3 For an explication and defense of this point, see Block (1978).
4 Discussions with Benjamin George have convinced me that I am probably
conceding too much by granting that functionalism is not true given modern
English usage. But since my contention would only be strengthened if my thesis
were true (or if its truth-value were ambiguous), I will grant the point anyway.
5 Dennett is talking about Intentionality, but the same point can be made about
qualia.
1
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